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1. Introduction.
On the face of it, there are two types of essentialism. We may say that such and such is
essential to a kind, and we may say that such and such is essential to an individual. Thus,
supposing that Travis is in fact a bachelor, being unmarried is presumably not essential to
him, though unmarriedness seems to be essential to the kind BACHELOR1. Qua bachelors,
bachelors are essentially unmarried; Travis himself is not.
      But does it make sense to attribute essential properties to an individual in itself, not
considered as something of this or that kind? A negative answer might have always been in
the air; in print, one may think particularly of Quine and Locke.2 It is partly against this
background that Kripke’s discussions of essential properties of individuals in the early 1970s
was considered revolutionary.
      My thesis is that the more traditional type of essentialism (about kinds) suffers from a
difficulty concerning transworld identity to which the more revolutionary essentialism (about
1 Surely a most unnatural kind. I chose it so that I can present one case of a property indisputably essential to a
kind. I presume the received view—perhaps originated with Putnam (1970)—that only very few kind terms
have analytical definitions, and will argue that ascription of essential properties is problematic for the rest.
2 For Quine’s example of cyclist mathematicians, see (1960: 199). For Locke’s view that it is only to “Sorts” that
one may significantly attribute nominal or real essences, see Essay III.vi.4f.
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individuals) seems to be immune. I will have space only enough to expose the problem;
whether or not it can be reasonably solved is a separate issue, and my own pessimistic
analysis can only be outlined here.3 However, given that the problem seems to be previously
unnoticed as such, I will consider this article a success if I manage to convince you that there
is a nontrivial transworld identity problem for kinds, a problem which cannot be trivialized
or easily dissolved in the way that Kripke treats the transworld identity problem for objects4.
2. Transworld identity: individuals vs kinds.
Let us explicitly define the two notions of essentiality.5
Definition 1. A property is essential ‌ to an object iff that object has it in every possible
world wherein the object exists.
3 For a more detailed account, see my doctoral dissertation, available online at
   https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/16814/1/Lajevardi_Kaveh_200811
_PhD_thesis.pdf
4  I use ‘object’ and ‘individual’ interchangeably. Defining what is exactly meant by these terms is not easy; but,
at any rate, I think the difference between the water in this glass and the kind WATER is intuitively clear. Also, I
am aware that while talking about (say) the water in a given glass, it sounds rather awkward to refer to the
water as an ‘object’ or ‘individual’; but let it pass. 
5 My task here is not analyzing the notion of essence; rather, it is whether one can meaningfully talk about
individuals and kinds having some of their properties necessarily (see the official definitions in the text); so
that Fine’s (1994) criticism of characterizing essence in modal terms need not bother us. 
            Until recently, it was customary to use ‘essentially’ synonymously with ‘necessarily’. For sake of brevity, I
omit a long list of quotational evidence and keep just one from Kripke (1980: 135): “though each of these
items is, indeed, essentially (necessarily) gold, gold might have existed even if the items did not”. I stick with
the old terminology.
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Definition 2. A property P is essential ‌ to a kind K iff for every possible world W and
for every object b, if b‌ does not have P in W then b is not a K in W.6 
While many philosophers, even some of those of an empiricist persuasion, could
tolerate the attribution of essential properties to kinds, ascribing necessary properties
to individuals used to raise eyebrows. Whereas attributing essential properties to kinds
is to make de dicto modal statements, the attribution of essential properties to
individuals clearly involves modality de re. And modality de re has been thought to be
marred by difficulties far more serious than those affecting modality de dicto. Here I
am concerned with one such difficulty as a preamble to my own problem with
essentialism about kinds.
      Prior to the immense influence of Kripke (1971, 1980), one might have suspected that the
very notion of a necessary or contingent property of an object per se is problematic or even
outright incoherent unless it comes with a solution to the problem of transworld identity for
objects: “If you want to investigate whether having green eyes is essential to Travis,” the
sceptic might have said, “you must first identify Travis in other possible worlds: only
afterwards you may be able to examine the colour of Travis’s eyes in those worlds. And it is
not clear how one could, even in principle, do this—among the individuals in a given possible
world, it is not clear which one is Travis”. The problem is metaphysical, not epistemological:
the sceptic is asking what Travis is in another possible world, not just how to tell what Travis
6 Definition 1 is explicitly given by Kripke (1971: 151f), together with an extensionally equivalent one.
Definition 2, though not explicit in Kripke, is unambiguously suggested by his examples of essential
properties of GOLD and CAT (1980: 124, 126). I will keep exegesis at a very minimal level in this article.
          Following Kripke (1980: 21n21), I shall not touch the issue of the necessary existence of every actually
existing object, which is a consequence of this raw form of Definition 1.
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is there.7
      To see how significant the transworld identity problem was supposed to be, it suffices to
recall that at least one prominent living philosopher of the ante-Kripkean era once considered
it as the main problem in modal logic—here is David Kaplan of the late sixties (1979: 94, my
square brackets):
this [the transworld identification problem] is the central problem of philosophical interest in
the development of intensional logic. The other problems are all technical. 
     Now, Kripke famously argues (1980: 43-47, 1971: 146-149) that there is no genuine problem
of transworld identity for individuals. Talking about a possible world wherein Nixon loses
the 1968 elections, Kripke informs us that it is part of the very description of that world that
Nixon loses the elections there. Possible worlds, in Kripkean understanding of them, need not
be described purely qualitatively; rather, in talking about such a possible world, it is given that
we are talking about Nixon; we simply stipulate that we are talking about him, about Nixon
himself, and that he loses the elections there.8 “‘Possible worlds’ are stipulated, not discovered by
powerful telescopes” (1980: 44).
      To make myself clearer, let me say what I mean by the transworld identity problem for
individuals, in juxtaposition with the corresponding problem for kinds. 
7 There is a tight connexion between the transworld identity problem and de re scepticism: Fine (1978)
demonstrates that a formula is kosher in view of the de re sceptic (i.e., it has a provably de dicto equivalent) if
and only if the determination of its truth-value does not require a solution to the relevant transworld identity
problem.
8 Pardon my excessive use of italics. See 3.3. below in the text.
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Transworld identity (TI) problem for individuals. Let each of a and b be an individual, and
let a and b inhabit different possible worlds. Under what conditions are a and b one and the
same individual?
TI problem for kinds. Let a and b be individuals in different possible worlds. What is it for a
and b to be of the same kind K? 
In practice, specially in case of TI for kinds, one of the possible worlds in question is the
actual world.9 
      You might wonder if the second one is a misname. I think it is not. Kripke’s argument for
the essentiality of animalhood for the kind CAT goes like this:10 he considers a counterfactual
situation with some non-animals, say a number of little cat-like demons, and asks whether
they are cats. There are two possible worlds—the actual one and the one just described—and
the question is whether some things there and some things here are of the same kind, CAT.
What matters is whether the individuals thus considered in different worlds belong to the
extension of the same kind-term in those worlds as we, in the actual world, use that term. Or
he asks if, in the way we use ‘gold’, shiny non-metal things in a possible world are gold.
      Now Kripke adduces examples like Nixon’s losing the elections to argue that the TI
problem for individuals need not bother us at all. I think the way Kripke deals with the issue
of TI for individuals has its roots in the way we do the possible-worlds semantics for modal
logic. (And I take him to be arguing that this is the way we should talk about possible worlds.)
If so, no wonder that Kripke—one of the founding fathers of this semantics—favours this
approach. I will briefly explain how the possible-worlds semantics turns the TI question for
9 This may be explained by the main thesis of Adams (1981).
10 See, again, Kripke (1980: 124, 126) for the case of gold and cats. 
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individuals into a pseudo-problem, and then argue that there is a problem with transworld
identity of kinds, as opposed to objects, when looked at through the lens of this semantics. 
      The following catechism may illustrate the stark difference between the two.
   Q. What is it for the individual a to be an F in a possible world W? More
precisely, what is it for the formula ‘Fx‌’ to be true in W‌ when the value a is
assigned to the free variable ‘x’?
   A. The truth-value in question is T just in case a lies within the extension of F
in W.11 
   Q. What is F in W? 
   A.  It should be given at the outset. In fact, W is not specified as a possible
world unless the extension of F‌ in it is specified.
   Q. What is a in W?
   A. It is just a. 
In the standard semantics, in order to say what it is for a to be an F in W, there is no question
at all about a: it is a matter of a itself lying in the extension of F ‌ in W. The individual a is the
same in every possible world wherein it exists. The name of an individual, if it has a name, is
a rigid designator. (The same is the case for free variables: as Kripke (1980: 49n16) says, “free
variables can be used as rigid designators of unspecified objects”. In fact, as Kaplan says,
variables are “paradigms of rigid designation” (1989: 493); so it really does not matter
whether or not we have a name for the individual in question.) This, I submit, is a
fundamental presumption of our standard model theory for modal logic.12
11 Here we need not be concerned about accessibility relation between possible worlds—vide Kripke (1963). 
12  The relationship between rigidity and the standard semantics has also been observed by Stanley: “rigidity
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      On the contrary, the meaningfulness of the question of an individual a being an F in W
requires a determinate answer to this question: What is the extension of F in W? The question
of TI does arise for F. When talking about this object, Nixon, in other possible worlds, there is
no problem about the thing we are talking about (and ‘Nixon’, as used by us, designates the
same object, if any, in every possible world). But if we want to talk about cats being such and
such in a possible world W, we have to specify the extension of the predicate ‘is a cat’ in W,
and the extension may well differ from world to world. So there is an asymmetry between the
case of individuals (referents of proper names) and kinds (referents of kind terms, or referents
of some predicates); the TI problem for the latter does make sense, and solving it is a
prerequisite for talking about Ks in other possible worlds. 
      Admittedly, one might argue that some essentialist claims about kinds are unproblematic
with respect to the transworld identity problem, due to the logical form of the statements
themselves. Thus one might say that being liquid-or-non-liquid is essential to the kind WATER
since no matter how we solve the TI problem for water (and for liquid), in every possible
world each instance of water is either liquid or non-liquid. But, of course, this is not a typical
essentialist claim—after all, insofar as it has a truth-value, the statement that water is
necessarily liquid-or-non-liquid is knowable a priori. Thus if not all, at least every
“interesting”, a posteriori essentialist claim about kinds requires a solution to the relevant TI
problem.
This, then, is the difficulty I see in attributing essential properties to kinds: before
investigating whether such and such is necessary for a given kind K, we have to know what
the extension of K is in a non-actual possible world—we have to identify instances of K in
other possible worlds. Because of the way we deal with individuals across possible worlds,
arose in the development of the semantics of Quantified Modal Logic” (1997: 558). 
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the problem does not arise when we want to attribute an essential property to an individual—
or, rather, it has a trivial answer.13 Not so in the case of kinds. 
3. Any solutions?
Let me discuss, in a very programatic manner, what might be said against some ideas for a
solution. This should be considered as something like an extended abstract of a long, book-
length essay; I just want to present the headings here.
3.1. The same old universal. One may entertain answering the question about the transworld
identity of a kind, say GOLD, by simply saying that for every possible world and every object
in it, the object is gold iff it instantiates the same universal, GOLD. Arguably, something along
this line of thought can be seen in Donnellan’s (1983) attempt to define rigidity for kind terms.
      I hope I will be excused for being rather short with this approach here. One may argue
that reducing the TI for kinds to the TI for universals is just a re-labeling of the problem. (The
other suggestions considered below do not have this defect.) But, perhaps more relevantly, I
think the suggested idea is not Kripkean at all. It seems to me that, insofar as Kripke touches
the issue of the TI for gold and cats, he has another criterion in mind, namely,
13 Kripke’s trivializing solution to the TI problem for individuals can be seen as an endorsement of some
version of haecceitism—see Salmon (1996: 204). Ignoring a number of niceties, one may regard this as the
doctrine that the facts concerning an individual across possible worlds are “primitive”. What makes the TI
problem for kinds more pressing is that the corresponding doctrine for properties, known as quidditism, is not
remotely as plausible as haecceitism—see Black (2000). Here I do not directly rely on arguments against
quidditism: I just want to draw attentions to the fact that while there is a ready and standard way of
trivializing the TI problem for individuals, no such thing is at hand in the case of kinds or properties.
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3.2. “That kind of thing”. One may think of defining extensions of kinds across possible
worlds by means of suitable equivalence relations of sameness of kind. (Think of the classic
Fregean way of defining the direction of a line by means of the relation ‘x is parallel to y’.) An
in-detail way of doing this is presented in Putnam (1975). Suppose we had previously pointed
to a glass and said, as a matter of ostensive definition, ‘this is water’. Then, according to
Putnam (1975: 231), the relation sameL (same liquid as) gives us the extension of water in
every possible world:
(For every world W) (For every x in W) (x is water " x bears sameL to the entity referred to as
‘this’ in the actual world W1),
where “x bears the relation sameL to y just in case (1) x and y are both liquids, and (2) x and y
agree in important physical properties” (1975: 328f), and this is followed by an elaboration of
what physical properties are to be considered as important. It seems that at places in Naming
and Necessity something like this idea is at work.14
      What can be said about this solution? Well, a lot has been said about this by its former
champion, Hilary Putnam. In a not much cited paper, Putnam (1990: 70) concludes his
lengthy argument by saying 
I now think that the question, “What is the necessary and sufficient condition for being water
in all possible worlds?” makes no sense at all. And this means that I now reject “metaphysical
necessity.” 
14 See Kripke (1980: 119) on gold, and the example of polywater in (1980: 129). I took the title of this subsection
from Kripke (1980: 122): “The original concept of a cat is: that kind of thing, where the kind can be identified by
paradigmatic instances.” Some exegetical work, which I omit from this article, would  show differences
between Kripke and Putnam here.
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In a fuller presentation of my view, I would examine Putnam’s argument and make
comments here and there;15 but I am in agreement with this much: Putnam’s argument shows
that the that-kind-of-thing solution to the TI problem for kinds does not help the essentialist
to make sense of his essentialism—very briefly, Putnam’s line of argument (or my reading
thereof) is that importance is interest-relative, while metaphysical necessity is allegedly not. 
      Given that Putnam’s conclusion in the latter work is the rejection of metaphysical
necessity altogether, it seems safe to infer that Putnam considers this suggestion as the only
candidate for a solution to the TI problem for kinds. But we may think of another, more
Kripkean, idea:
3.3. Stipulation. 
There are certain passages in Kripke suggesting that the TI problem for properties can be
solved stipulatively, in a way that is even more trivial than the case of individuals. Here is one
(1971: 148): 
And there seems to be no less objection to stipulating that we are speaking of certain
people than there can be objection to stipulating that we are speaking of certain qualities.
Advocates of the other view take speaking of certain qualities as unobjectionable. They
do not say, “How do we know that this quality (in another possible world) is that of
redness?”16
15 Putnam says that the transworld identity problem for kinds (not so labelled by Putnam himself), cannot be
put in a way that Kripkean essentialists themselves would recognize it (1990: 57, 63ff). It is my hope that my
reader now thinks I have done just that in this article.
16 Cf. Kripke (1980: 52f), where he discusses a counterfactual talk about a table being painted green: “I have
stipulated that I am talking about greenness.”
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      Now for every natural kind K we may consider the property of being an instance of K, and it
would seem plausible to say that, for Kripke, there is no real problem about the TI for natural
kinds either. It seems that in Kripke’s view, the TI problem for kinds is only a pseudo-
problem—perhaps even more of a pseudo-problem than the TI for individuals.
      There are a number of important unanswered questions here, though. What is it to
stipulate something in a possible-worlds discussion? How and why does stipulation work?
For what types of questions is stipulation permissible? I think even in the case of the TI
problem for individuals we need to hear more about stipulation. When Kripke vehemently
argues that there is an obvious stipulative answer to the TI problem for objects (e.g. for Nixon,
(1980: 44ff)), occasionally methinks that much of the argumentative work is done by means of
italics and emphatic phrases like ‘he himself’—we are not really told what stipulation is.
      So I do not think that we are well informed about stipulation to receive the stipulative
move as a complete solution to the TI problem. But I also think that there is an argument
against the stipulative idea for natural kinds. Here is a concise presentation of its main steps:
!. Stipulation about properties requires some sort of primitiveness about properties.
[The justification of this requires philosophizing about the very notion of stipulation;
key ideas are borrowed from Salmon (1996) and especially Adams (1979).]
". The identities of real properties are non-primitive in the relevant sense. 
[I would argue that real properties—but perhaps not gruesome ones—are
individuated by their nomic profiles (following Shoemaker (1980, 1998)); hence their
identities are not primitive in the sense required by (#).]
#. For each natural kind K, the property of being an instance of K is subject to ($).
:. Stipulation about natural kinds is illegitimate.
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4. Concluding remarks.
I close with a number of clarificatory remarks.
4.1. Kinds as individuals? Perhaps kind terms are really proper names for some
complex individuals? No. One may think of this for biological species, but I am not
sure if it makes much sense for, say, the kind GOLD. More relevantly, it seems that
considering kind terms as predicates—and not as singular terms— is the default
position, or at least so it was in 1970, when Kripke delivered his lectures on naming
and necessity. Had Kripke thought otherwise he would have commented on the issue.
In fact, he says (1980: 127, my italics) “The old term ‘common name’ is thus quite
appropriate for predicates marking out species or natural kinds, such as ‘cow’ or
‘tiger’.”
4.2. I am not concerned about rigidity of general terms. As is well known, Kripke
defines rigidity for singular terms only, and it is not clear how the definition should be
extended to general terms. This may cause some troubles for Kripkean essentialism as
advocated in Lecture III of Kripke (1980), where the supposed rigidity of some kind
terms is thought to play a rôle. However, the notion of rigidity of general terms is not
what I find most worrisome in essentialism about kinds. My apprehension is more
fundamental: prior to examining a claim to the effect that a kind is necessarily such
and such, I need to know what it is for instances of that kind to be such and such in a
possible world. As we use the term ‘water’, what is in its extension in non-actual
possible worlds? I think it is only after answering this question that one can move on
and talk about the rigidity of ‘water’ or defend an essentialist claim about water. 
      My main question, again, is the transworld identity problem for kinds, here posed for the
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kind water: What is it for an object in a non-actual possible world to be of the kind water in
that world? One should keep in mind that to satisfy a Kripkean essentialist, the answer
should be such that the proposition expressed by ‘Water is H2O’ turns out to be necessary a
posteriori. Thus in this context one cannot blithely say that by ‘water’ one just means H2O.
      In fairness to Kripke, it should be mentioned that although he does say that, e.g.,
the general term ‘gold’ is rigid (1980: 136), in his argument for the essentialist claim
concerning gold he does not appeal to the alleged rigidity of ‘gold’: he never uses
‘rigid’ there (1980: 123ff).17 So perhaps Kripke really need not define rigidity for general
terms in order to defend his essentialism about natural kinds. On the contrary, in his
arguments for the necessity of true statements of identity of natural phenomena he
heavily appeals to rigidity claims, as is manifest in case of pain in his argument against
the mind-body identity theory (1980: 148f). So perhaps the lack of a clear definition of
rigidity for general terms does not threaten Kripke’s essentialism about kinds like gold
and water; what does pose a threat to Kripkean natural-kind essentialism is the
transworld identity problem for such kinds, if I am right.18
      
17  See also the case of cats being animals in (1980: 122, 125f); again, in the course of his argument, Kripke does
not talk about the rigidity of ‘cat’.
18  To narrow down my discussion, in this article I have not talked about natural phenomena (like heat) and
their names. There might be deeper reasons for considering natural-kind terms and natural-phenomenon
terms separately: Gray (2006) suggests the semantics of the two are different.
13 
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